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ABSTRACT
With data-driven analytics becoming mainstream, the global
demand for dedicated AI and Deep Learning accelerator chips
is soaring. These accelerators, designed with densely packed
Processing Elements (PE), are especially vulnerable to the
manufacturing defects and functional faults common in the
advanced semiconductor process nodes resulting in significant
yield loss. In this work, we demonstrate an application-driven
methodology to reduce the yield loss of AI accelerators by
correlating the circuit faults in the PEs of the accelerator with
the desired accuracy of the AI workload execution. We exploit
the error-healing properties of backpropagation during training,
and the inherent fault tolerance features of trained deep learning
models during inference to develop the presented yield loss
reduction and test methodology. An analytical relationship is
derived between fault location, fault rate, and the AI task‘s
accuracy for deciding if the accelerator chip can pass the final
yield test. An yield-loss reduction aware fault isolation, ATPG,
and test flow are presented for the multiply and accumulate
units of the PEs. Results obtained with widely used AI/deep
learning benchmarks demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed
approach in the reduction of yield loss of AI accelerator designs
while maintaining the desired accuracy of AI tasks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The demand for Artificial Intelligence (AI) and deep learning
is growing at a rapid pace across a wide range of applications
such, as self-driving vehicles, image and voice recognition,
medical imaging and diagnosis, finance and banking, natural
resource explorations, defense operations, etc. Because of these
data-driven analytics and AI boom, demands in deep learning
and AI will emerge at both data centers and the edge [1]-[8]. In
a recent market research [8], it has been reported that AI-related
semiconductors will see a growth of about 18 percent annually
over the next few years - five times greater than the rate for
non-AI applications. By 2025, AI-related semiconductors could
account for almost 20 percent of all semiconductor demand,
which would translate into about $67 billion in revenue [8].
Although GPU was adopted by the AI community, by design
GPUs were not optimized for AI workloads [8][9]. As a
result significant R&D efforts in developing AI accelerators -
optimized to achieve much higher throughput in deep learning
compared to GPUs - are underway from academia [2][3], big
techs [4]-[6], as well as startups [7][10]. Dedicated accelerators
are in high demand for both the cloud-based training, and
inference tasks on edge devices. The training procedure is
time-consuming as it requires many learning samples to adapt
the network parameters. For instance, a self-driving carâA˘Z´s
neural network has to be trained with many images of possible
objects it can encounter on the road, and this will require
multiple high-performance AI accelerators on the cloud. During
inference, AI algorithms handle less data but rapid responses
are required as they are often used in critical time-sensitive
applications. For example, an autonomous vehicle has to
make immediate decisions on objects it sees during driving, a
medical device must interpret a trauma patientâA˘Z´s brain scans
immediately. As a result, high throughput accelerators running
on edge devices and capable of fast inference are required.
In AI technology innovation and leadership, high-throughput
AI accelerator hardware chips will serve as the differentiator
[8][10].
Millions of Multiply and Accumulate (MAC) operations
are needed in modern AI tasks, for example, AlexNet [11]
and ResNET-50 [12] require 0.7 Billion and 3.7 Billion
MAC operations, respectively, to classify a single image from
the ImageNet [14] dataset. Modern AI accelerators contain
thousands of Processing Elements (PE) distributed in densely
packed arrays in a single chip/die [1]-[5] or in a multi-
chiplet based chip [10]. To accommodate as many PEs as
possible in the AI accelerator, a large chip (e.g., wafer-scale)
would be the best solution [10]. However, manufacturing
large chips is difficult due to the long interconnect wires
and the possibility of particle defects. Aggressive scaling of
design rules [15], lithography imperfections [16], local edge
roughness, interconnect pitch reduction, etc., in 10nm and
newer semiconductor technologies [15] have caused yield (i.e.,
the fraction of total manufactured chips that can be sold to
the customer) to become as important as the conventional
design metrics of Power, Performance, Area (PPA) for the
process to be economically viable [17][18]. Moreover, internal
cell defects have become a major yield limiter because of
aggressive scaling of design rules and lithography limitations
in printing the features, giving rise to cell-aware test [19].
In addition to the regular stuck-at and timing faults at the
cell I/O level, at advanced technologies, the transistor-level
and other cell-internal faults need to be added to the fault
list as yield has become more vulnerable to internal cell
defects [20]. Although yield data of semiconductor process are
considered a well-guarded trade secret and not published, it
is well known that yield loss has caused significant delays in
product readiness, and loss in market share and revenue for a
leading processor manufacturer at 10nm [21]. To integrate more
PE in the accelerator, a two-level chiplet [22] based approach,
where many PE are placed on a smaller chiplet, and then
multiple chiplets are connected with silicon interconnect fabric
[23] to form the accelerator is a viable solution. Although a
relatively smaller size would minimize particle-induced random
defects on upper metal layers in the chiplets and improve
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defect-induced yield loss, the individual PEs - internal to the
chiplet - will still be susceptible to systematic defects [17] and
lithography imperfections [15] that impact the transistor layers
or the ultra-dense lower metal layers.
As many PEs are densely placed in the AI accelerators,
defects and circuit faults are likely to occur in some PEs.
Fortunately, the stochasticity inherent in the backpropagation-
based training of Deep Neural Networks (NN) and Deep
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) - the primary building
blocks of AI systems - offers a certain degree of resilience
and error tolerance to deep learning tasks. Moreover, the
intelligent application of techniques such as dropout, pruning,
and quantization during training can further increase the
robustness of a trained NN/CNN against variations and noise
during inference [24]-[27]. The error-resilience properties of
well-trained deep NN/CNNs can be exploited in hardware by
allowing the PE of the dense AI accelerator to incur some
circuit faults - caused by semiconductor manufacturing process
variation induced defects - and still function correctly within an
accuracy bound. As a result, a fault-tolerance aware test flow
is required for these accelerators - for both single chip/die and
multi-chiplet architectures - that can test the individual PEs,
and certify if the fault of the PE is acceptable or unacceptable
depending on how many of the rest of the PEs are fault-
free or faulty, and the impact of faults on AI accuracy. An
innovative solution would be to implement a fine-grained fault
tolerance scheme that allows the deactivation of an individual
chiplet or individual PEs in the event that the PE fault rate
(i.e., the fraction of PEs that are faulty) exceeds a threshold.
Following this approach, an AI accelerator with some faulty
PEs to still function, and will not cause the discard of the
whole AI accelerator chip, resulting in a significant reduction
in yield loss [15]-[18].
In this paper, we propose YAOTA: Yield and Accuracy aware
Optimum Test of AI accelerators, which considers the accuracy-
sensitivity and fault-tolerance of AI applications into test pattern
generation for the accelerator chip/chiplet in deciding whether
it will pass the yield test. The key contributions and highlights
of this paper are as follows,
• An analytical relationship is established - based on the
actual AI workload to be executed - between the (i) faults
of the MAC modules, (ii) the rate of faults, and the
accuracy of the AI task. This relationship is later used in
demonstrating that AI accelerator chiplet/chips can still
function correctly despite having few faulty PEs, thus
saving yield significantly.
• An accuracy-aware fault isolation and test pattern genera-
tion methodology is presented to group the MAC faults by
their logic cones into categories: (i) critical (unacceptable),
and (ii) non-critical (acceptable), according to their impact
on the accuracy of AI workload. Responses from these
test patterns dictate yield decisions - whether to ship to the
customer at reduced throughput, or discard as yield loss.
Using the reduced test pattern set for critical faults, only
the critical faults of the AI accelerator can be tested as a
quick method to assess the yield at reduced tester time
and cost. Next, the chips that passed the first yield-test
can be tested for non-critical faults to grade those into
different speed/throughput bins.
• A strategy of retraining and selective deactivation of faulty
PEs during inference is presented to minimize the accuracy
loss due to faulty MACs.
• Simulation results from 50,000 image samples on widely
used CNN (AlexNet, ResNet-50, VGG16, LeNet5) [39],
and 10,000 data samples on different NN architectures are
presented to demonstrate the relationship between fault
rate and accuracy. Results show that with 5% fault rate
the normalized accuracy of NN and CNN only degrade
by less than 1%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work
and AI/Deep learning accelerator backgrounds are covered
in Section II. The proposed YAOTA methodology, test flow,
and hardware control scheme are presented in Section III.
Simulation results are presented in Section IV followed by
conclusions in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Related Work
The correlation between the AI task’s accuracy and computa-
tional errors in PE (i.e., multiplier and adders) has been studied
by researchers in developing energy-efficient AI accelerator
architectures. In [28]-[31], by exploiting the inherent error
tolerance of NN/CNN to improve energy efficiency at the
cost of minor accuracy loss, approximate computing (e.g.,
low power approximate multipliers) techniques with retraining
were applied. From the backpropagation analysis for a certain
benchmark, each neuron was ranked according to its sensitivity
and error contribution to the output of the network, and
neurons that contributed the least to the global error were then
approximated [28][29]. To recover a portion of the loss caused
by approximation, the NN/CNN was incrementally retrained
with the approximations in-place. In hardware execution,
neurons that were approximated were assigned to approximate
PEs, while others were assigned to exact PEs [28][29]. In
[31] errors caused by the use of approximate multipliers
were modeled as noise similar to the dropout technique [27].
Retraining was performed to adapt the NN/CNN to this
workload-specific noise patterns such that only a minor amount
of accuracy was lost during inference because of the use of
approximate multipliers. The authors in [31] demonstrated
that, in addition to being workload/benchmark dependent,
the success of their approach was also dependent on the
hardware structure of the approximate multipliers. However,
the challenges with these approaches are, (i) sensitivity-based
sorting, approximation, and retraining of neurons are always
dependent on the workload [31]. For example, the same network
will have different sensitivities for SVHN and ImageNet [14]
datasets. (ii) Assigning less sensitive neurons to approximate
PEs will require runtime hardware reconfiguration for different
tasks. (iii) In [28]-[31] pruning was not considered, but in
modern NN/CNN pruning is applied as a well-established
method to reduce network size where less important/sensitive
connections are already pruned/removed during training [24]-
[26]. Hence, the techniques of [28]-[31] will be much less
effective when applied on an already pruned NN/CNN. (iv)
Since these approximate CNN/NN assume that the only source
of error is the deterministic approximate multiplier and adders,
any additional faults in the execution hardware from process
variation induced defects will cause a significant amount of
inaccuracy in the prediction during inference, and will further
require costly approximation-aware fault testing [33][34].
With the widespread use of NN/CNN and the rise of AI
accelerators, the testing of these hardware has become an
emerging research problem [32]-[34]. In [32], a comprehensive
structural test flow was proposed that first identified critical
faults by comparing the accuracies of the exact fault-free
gate-level circuit of the neural network, and that of a faulty
version. Next, the entire circuit was converted into an Boolean
satisfiability (SAT) instance and solved with SAT solver with
test patterns for the critical faults only. Since this approach
is expensive and not scalable, a functional test method was
proposed [32], where real workloads - the test images from
MNIST and CIFAR10 benchmarks - are applied as test input to
the gate-level netlist of the implemented neural network. To find
if a fault was critical or ignorable, the fault was first injected
into a neuron module and the test image set was applied. If the
prediction accuracy of the test image set was within a certain
threshold, the fault was considered unimportant, otherwise, it
was a critical fault. The proposed simple approach of creating
RTL of the full neural network, followed by gate-level synthesis
and fault injection may be applicable for the basic neural
networks classifying images with at most 10 possible classes
(MNIST and CIFAR10 as used in [32]), however, this approach
will not be scalable for mainstream CNNs [39] such as AlexNet,
VGG, ResNet, MobileNet, etc. that are used for real-world
computer vision tasks of image recognition with many classes
[1][2]. For instance, the widely used ImageNet [14] benchmark
has 1000 classes. Moreover, in contrast to the very basic neural
networks such as MNIST/CIFAR10 classifiers, the standard
CNNs require millions of Multiply and Accumulate (MAC)
operations to classify a single image [39].
B. AI/Deep Learning Accelerator Architecture and Processing
Element Faults
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Figure 1. (a) Deep NN; (b) Deep CNN; (c) Convolution in CNN [1][39].
At the essence of AI and Deep Learning algorithms are the
backpropagation-based NN and CNN. As shown in Fig. 1 (a), a
deep NN consists of an input layer, followed by several hidden
layers and one final output layer. Depending on the size of
training data samples, the complexity of training, dropout, and
pruning rate, some layers in the NN can be fully connected and
others sparsely connected [24]-[27]. The connection strengths
between the adjacent layers are represented by a weight
matrix W , and the matrix parameters wi are learned by
the backpropagation equation, ∆wi = −a∗ ∂Error∂wi , where a is
learning rate and Error is the prediction error. During the
forward pass at both training and inference phases, the output
activation of a layer, Xo, is obtained by multiplying the input
activation vector with the weight matrix followed by addition
of a bias term (if any), and finally passing the result through an
non-linear function such as ReLU, Xo = ReLu(Xi ∗W +b). It is
evident from this equation that the dominant operation in NN
is Multiply & Accumulate (MAC) in matrix multiplications
and bias term additions, of which multiplication is the most
hardware intensive. For a fully connected NN with input
layer of size Ninput , Kh hidden layers each of size Nhidden,
and output layer of size Nout put , the total number of required
multiplications to classify a single sample is, (Ninput ∗Nhidden)+
(Nhidden ∗Nhidden)∗ (Kh−1)+(Nhidden ∗Nout put).
Because of their robustness and accuracy, deep CNNs have
become the standard for image and pattern recognition [1][39].
The operation of a deep CNN is briefly shown in Fig. 1
(b). During training and inference, each image or pattern
is convolved successively with a set of filters where each
filter has a set of kernels. After ReLU activation and pooling
(i.e., subsampling), the convolution operation is repeated with
a new set of filters. Finally, before the output stage, fully
connected NNs are used. The convolution operation is shown
in Fig. 1 (c) and it consists of dot products between the
input feature-maps/image and filter weights, mathematically,
fout(m,n) = ∑ j∑k h( j,k) fin(m− j,n− k). For a single convo-
lution layer, the total number of multiplications is given by,
Nin_channel ∗Dk ∗Dk ∗D f ∗D f ∗Nout_channel , where Dk is kernel
dimension, D f is output feature map dimension, Nin_channel is
number of input channels, and number of output channels is
Nout_channel . For deep CNNs with many convolution layers,
the total number required multiplications to classify each
input image/pattern sample is a substantial number, and MAC
operations in the convolution layers and fully connected layers
account for 90% or more of the total computational cost [1]-[4].
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Figure 2. AI accelerator with PE arrays performing MAC.
Since the computations in NN/CNN are mostly dominated
by MAC operations, the AI accelerators, as shown in Fig. 2,
are primarily occupied with arrays of Processing Elements
(PE) optimized for fast MAC function [1]-[4]. Depending on
if the accelerators are for training and inference or only for
inference on edge devices, the MAC units can be of 32 bits
supporting FP32 or 8 bits for int8 [36] quantized operations
[1][35]. To optimize silicon utilization, the large number of
PEs are densely placed on the chip die [1]-[4]. As a result, the
yield of the accelerator will be primarily dictated by circuit
faults (e.g., stuck-at, timing, etc.,) in MAC modules of the PEs.
Categorization of the location and rate of the faults as critical or
non-critical with respect to the desired accuracy of the AI task,
and corresponding fault-criticality-aware test pattern generation
can save time and cost associated with final yield evaluation.
Also, this will allow more chips to pass the functional test
(within an accuracy bound of the AI task) resulting in improved
yield (i.e., more accelerator chip/chiplets passing the quality
test at different specs) at advanced technology nodes.
III. YAOTA: YIELD AND ACCURACY AWARE OPTIMUM
TEST FOR AI ACCELERATORS
The semiconductor manufacturing defects and corresponding
circuit faults in the MAC units of the PE in an AI accelerator
need a deeper investigation with regards to its impact on the
accuracy of AI and deep learning workloads. Any circuit fault
(e.g., stuck-at, timing, etc.,) on the 32-bit (FP32 format) or
8-bit (for int8 quantization [36]) multipliers and adders will
cause a certain precision loss and inaccuracy at the output of
MAC. The important question is, "in an AI accelerator with
thousands of PEs with MAC units, will the presence of a few
faulty MACs cause the whole accelerator chip to be discarded,
resulting in the loss of yield and revenue?" A scientifically
pragmatic solution would be to assess the impact of MAC
circuit faults on the training and inference accuracy of AI
workloads executed on these accelerators. The key factors to
consider in this assessment are, (i) location of the faults inside
the PE and its impact on the precision of MAC output, (ii) the
fraction of the total PEs that have faulty MACs, (iii) the type
of AI workload, and (iv) if the accelerator is for both training
and inference, or inference-only.
A. Fault location, MAC Precision and AI Accuracy
Systematic defects and yield losses are caused by layout-
sensitive lithographic hotspots and other process imperfections,
variations, and are generally independent of the layout area [17].
On the other hand, random defect generated yield losses are
caused by defect particles and are dependent on the standard-
cell or the layout area as well as the defect particle size [16][18].
These defects (e.g., short/open defect, poor contact/via, etc.) and
corresponding circuit faults can occur at different sites inside
the MAC circuit block. The precision loss - due to the presence
of circuit faults - at the output of multiply and accumulate
operation will depend on the location of the fault inside MAC
circuit and the logic cone impacted by the fault. For example,
if a multiplier circuit that performs the multiplication of two
8-bit numbers, has faults impacting upto K LSB bits, then it
will sustain worst-case error of ±∑K+1i=0 2i (the last 2K+1 term
comes from worst-case carry-in path of partial product addition,
as explained in the next subsection). As K increases, the faults
impact the more significant digits causing the worst-case error
of the multiplier to increase. Similarly, errors will also occur
in the adder circuit of the MAC if it is corrupted by faults.
Since the multiplier is the more dominant block in a MAC, it
will be more prone to faults and computation errors.
As explained in Section II(B), the computations in NNs and
CNNs for an AI workload execution are heavily dominated
by the MAC operations. Any inaccuracy in MAC output will
impact the accuracy and efficacy of the AI task running on
the accelerator. From the matrix multiplications in NN and
convolution operations in CNN, it can be inferred that despite a
certain amount of error in a few MAC modules, the AI tasks can
be accomplished with minimum accuracy loss. The relationship
between worst-case error per faulty MAC, percentage of MACs
that are faulty and the AI workload’s accuracy loss due to these
errors are correlated, and will depend on the specifics of the
NN/CNN architecture and the workload as will be demonstrated
in Section IV.
B. Yield and Accuracy Aware Fault Isolation and Test Pattern
Generation
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Figure 3. Simplified block diagram of MAC unit with logic cones.
Algorithm 1 Isolate critical and non-critical faults, and generate
test patterns accordingly for Multiplier and Adder
1: procedure GENERATE TEST PATTERNS FOR CRITICAL AND NON-CRITI AL FAULTS
2: Input: Gate-level netlist of the MAC module
3: Input: Maximum LSB bit position of MAC output that can tolerate errors, K
4: Output: List of critical faults, Fcrit
5: Output: List of non-critical faults, Fnon−crit
6: Output: ATPG test patterns for critical faults, Tcrit
7: Output: ATPG test patterns for non-critical faults, Tnon−crit
8: Initialization: , G1 = {}
9: Initialization: , G2 = {}
10: for i = 0 to max. LSB position K do
11: gi←all gates in the fan-in logic cone of output LSB of position i
12: G1← G1 ∪gi
13: end for
14: for i = K+1 to MSB position N do
15: hi←all gates in the fan-in logic cone of output bit of position i
16: G2← G2 ∪hi
17: end for
18: Gnon−crit = G1−G2
19: Gcarryin_bitK+1 ←all gates in the logic cone of carry_in pin of output bit K+1
20: Gcrit = G2−Gcarryin_bitK+1
21: Fcrit ←list of all faults (e.g., stuck-at) for gates in Gcrit
22: Fnon−crit ←list of all faults (e.g., stuck-at) for gates in Gnon−crit
23: Tcrit ←ATPG tool generated test patterns for faults in list Fcrit
24: Tnon−crit ←ATPG tool generated test patterns for faults in list Fnon−crit
25: end procedure
The precision loss and the extent of computational error
in a MAC will depend on the output bit positions that were
corrupted by the circuit faults (e.g., stuck-at and delay). In this
paper, we focus on stuck-at faults as they are more destructive
compared to delay faults. By analyzing the fan-in logic cone of
an output bit, we can isolate the circuit paths and standard-cell
logic gates that can contribute to a stuck-at fault at that output
bit. This can be explained with the multiplier and adder circuit
of Fig. 3, and Algorithm 1. In Fig. 3 the green (shaded) logic
cone consists of all the logic gates that are in the fan-in cone of
the first K Least Significant Bits (LSB) of the output. The red
cone contains the standard-cells that are present in the fan-in
logic cone of output bits at positions K+1 to the MSB bit N,
where N > K. From an extensive execution of AI benchmarks,
we identify the acceptable error range of a faulty MAC and
the fault rate that will not cause the AI task’s accuracy loss to
exceed a threshold. We define output bit up to K LSBs to be
non-critical from this workload-driven analysis. If circuit faults
located within the logic cone of the first K output bits are
non-critical then the resulting worst-case error of the MAC is
±∑K+1i=0 2i, because each bit position i - depending on whether
stuck-at-1 or stuck-at-0 - will introduce error ±2i, and an
additional worst-case error of ±2K+1 will occur because of
possibly wrong carry propagation to output bit position K+1
from bit K. The flow to isolate the critical and non-critical
faults of a MAC for AI tasks, and corresponding ATPG pattern
generation is presented in Algorithm 1. The inputs to the
algorithm are the gate-level netlist of the MAC and the bit
position K up to which the error is acceptable. The outputs
of Algorithm 1 in Lines 4 to 7, are the lists of critical (Fcrit)
and non-critical (Fnon−crit ) faults, and the ATPG patterns (Tcrit ,
Tnon−crit) that can detect these faults. In Lines 10 to 13, for
each bit position from 0 to K, the standard-cell logic gates in
the logic cone of that bit are identified and added to the list
G1. Similarly, in Lines 14 to 17 the logic gates in the fan-in
cone of the rest of the bits, K+1 to N (MSB), are obtained
in the list G2. In Line 18, the list G2 is subtracted from G1 to
obtain the list of non-critical gate list Gnon−crit . In Lines 18
to 19, the gates in the carry-in path of bit K+1 are identified
and subtracted from G2 to obtain the list of error critical gates
Gcrit . Finally, in Lines 21 to 24, the fault lists for these gates -
Fcrit and Fnon−crit - are fed to the ATPG tool to obtain the test
pattern sets Tcrit and Tnon−crit to test the AI-accuracy critical
and non-critical faults, respectively.
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Figure 4. Int8 [36] multiplication and addition. (a) 8-bit Baugh-Wooly signed
multiplier (logic cones of two LSBs are shown); (b) first 4 bits of the 16-bit
CLA adder (logic cones of two LSBs are shown.)
The standard data type used in the AI domain to represent the
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Figure 5. Logic cones of critical and non-critical bits are shown for 32 bit,
(a) floating point multiplication; (b) floating point addition.
NN connections, CNN filter weights, and activation outputs are
the 8-bit int8 quantized format or 32-bit floating-point (FP32)
format [1][3][4][35]. FP32 can be used for both training and
inference, but for inference-only devices (e.g., mobile and other
edge devices) the training is generally done in FP32 and then
the learned parameters are scaled to int8 and loaded in these
devices [3][35]. The Baugh-Wooly multiplier [40] - widely
used for multiplying two 8-bit signed numbers - is shown in
Fig. 4 (a). If acceptable faults are only allowed to affect the two
LSBs (i.e., K = 1 in Algorithm 1), all circuits in logic-cones
of outputs P0 and P1 - highlighted with red dots in Fig. 4 (a) -
are considered non-critical, and the rest of the circuits are fault-
critical. Similarly, in Fig. 4 (b) for the carry Look-ahead adder
of the MAC, the logic cones containing the non-critical circuits
and faults are shown for K = 1. For AI accelerators using
FP32 format floating-point multiplier and adder, as shown in
Fig. 5, circuit faults in logic cones of some of the lower order
(i.e., LSBs) bits of mantissa can be considered as non-critical,
and the circuit faults present in the logic cones of the rest of
the bits of mantissa, the exponent and sign bits need to be
considered critical as they can introduce large errors in the
result. The number of bits in mantissa that can be considered
non-critical will depend on the amount of error introduced by
stuck-at faults on those bits and the impact of this error in AI
task’s accuracy loss.
Next, we propose the test flow to identify faulty PEs, and the
use of a low area-overhead register memory to store the IDs
of the faulty PEs. A control scheme is presented to deactivate
some of the faulty PEs during inference and test, if required.
  
Figure 6. Proposed Failure Status Register (FSR) and controls to deactivate
faulty PEs in the accelerator as needed.
C. Post-fab Test of the AI Accelerator
After manufacturing, the accelerator chip/die is subjected
to structural and functional tests to identify if the PEs in
the densely packed arrays are functionally correct. Because of
defects from imperfections in the semiconductor manufacturing
process, some of the PEs will have faulty MAC units. First, the
test patterns Tcrit obtained using Algorithm 1, are applied in a
broadcast mode to all the PE/MACs to identify which units
will introduce large errors during matrix multiplications or
dot products in convolutions. The IDs of these faulty PEs are
recorded in the list Fail_IDcrit . Next, the test patterns Tnon−crit
are applied parallelly to all the PEs that passed the first test. The
IDs of the PEs that failed this second test are recorded in the
list Fail_IDnon−crit . Since the PEs that belong to Fail_IDcrit
have large MAC errors, they can be permanently disabled by
the manufacturer (similar to the practice of disabling faulty
cores in many-core processors [38]), or their Fail_IDcrit data
can be written to an on-chip non-volatile memory - Fault
Status Register (FSR) shown in Fig. 6 - for the customer to
decide if they want to use those PEs or not. The PEs belonging
to Fail_IDnon−crit have relatively small MAC errors and can
be acceptable depending on, (i) how many such errors exist
(i.e., number of elements in Fail_IDnon−crit), (ii) the type of
AI workload that will be executed by the customer and their
accuracy tolerance limits. Hence, the Fail_IDnon−crit contents
are written into the on-chip FSR for the customer to disable a
fraction of these faulty PEs with software at runtime and still
accomplish the AI tasks with minimal accuracy loss. As shown
in Fig. 6, control signals are transmitted from the FSR to all
the PEs to selectively disable the faulty PEs when needed. By
adopting this scheme, the manufacturer can avoid discarding
the full accelerator chip/die only because of the presence of
few PEs with faulty MACs, and thereby increase yield. The
overhead in this yield loss reduction are the extra on-chip
register (FSR) to store the IDs and the control signal routes to
disable faulty PEs.
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Figure 7. Accelerator used for Inference on edge/mobile devices with cloud-
trained parameters.
1) Accelerator used for Inference Only: For large datasets,
the training of deep NN/CNN is computationally intensive and
very time consuming, and generally requires many accelerators
or CPU/GPUs working in par llel. For example, training the
popular CNN model of AlexNet on imageNet [14] dataset
required 6 days with 2 GPUs [11]. Since mobile and other
edge devices cannot sustain this computational overhead, the
general trend for these devices is to use a pre-trained model
during inference. In this mode, using many CPU/GPUs and
dedicated accelerators the AI model is trained on the cloud,
and after training the model parameters and weights are loaded
in the edge device where a local AI accelerator is used to
perform the MAC operations required for inference [1][35].
Our proposed âA˘Ÿfault-aware cloud-trained edge-inferredâA˘Z´
inference flow is shown in Fig. 7. In this approach, after the
model has been completely trained in the cloud with high-
performance computing, an additional analysis is performed
to obtain the impact of MAC errors on inference accuracy.
This can be achieved by injecting on the post-trained model
in the cloud the same MAC errors that would occur in the
inference accelerator of the edge device, and obtaining the
corresponding accuracy changes as a look-up table of fault rate
vs. accuracy changes. In summary, the proposed flow will not
only generate the trained parameters of the AI model - similar
to the regular cloud-training and edge-inference paradigm [1] -
but also report the maximum allowed fault rate FRmax_non−crit
to be subsequently loaded into the accelerator hardware of the
edge device as a bitstream. During inference, the mobile/edge
accelerator’s FSR and control unit reads the FRmax_non−crit and
if it is lower than the current fault rate FRnon−crit , then the
control unit sends deactivation signals to disable some of the
PEs such that the fault rate is reduced to FRmax_non−crit as
shown in Fig. 7.
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Figure 8. Accelerator used in both Training and Inference.
Algorithm 2 Fault-aware training and inference on AI accel-
erator
1: procedure IDENTIFY THE MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE FAULT RATE OF PROCESSING
ELEMENTS (PE) IN THE ACCELERATOR FOR A GIVEN ACCURACY TARGET
2: Input: Minimum acceptable accuracy for inference, Acc_In f_threshold
3: Input: Training dataset for the deep CNN/NN
4: Input: Fault rate (i.e., rate of faulty PEs) of the accelarator, FRnon−crit
5: Input: IDs of all faulty PEs in the accelerator, F_ID= {Fail_IDnon−crit ,Fail_IDcrit}
6: Input: Fault rate adjustment step size, δstep
7: Output: Maximum allowed fault rate in the AI accelerator for inference at desired
accuracy, FRmax_non−crit
8: Initialization: Training accuracy, Acc_Train= 0
9: Initialization: Deactivate all faulty PEs in F_ID during training mode
10: Initialization: FRmax_non−crit = FRnon−crit
11: while (Acc_Train< Acc_In f_threshold) do
12: Acc_Train← training accuracy for the given dataset with FRmax modeled
in the backpropagation
13: if (Acc_Train< Acc_In f_threshold) then
14: FRmax_non−crit = FRmax_non−crit −δstep
15: end if
16: end while
17: end procedure
2) Accelerator used in Training and Inference: For cases
where the accelerator will be used for both training and
inference, further improvement in accuracy degradation caused
by MAC errors can be accomplished with fault-aware retraining.
Retraining is a popular tool in deep learning, and primarily
used to reduce the size of the NN/CNN by pruning [24]-
[26]. In retraining, the forward pass and backward passes are
made aware of the changes in the network, and this directs
Stochastic Gradient Descent based backpropagation flow to
evolve the weights of the NN/CNN accordingly to minimize
any accuracy loss stemming from these changes [25][28][29].
The proposed methodology is shown in Fig. 8 and explained
in Algorithm 2. The presence of possible errors in MAC
calculations during inference is modeled mathematically and
fed to the backpropagation weight-update flows similar to [28]-
[31]. During the training phase, first, the control unit reads the
FSR to obtain the IDs of faulty PEs. To ensure that the CNN/NN
will be trained to achieve the best accuracy, all faulty PEs (both
critical and non-critical) are disabled during the training phase
as shown in Fig. 8 and Line 9 in Algorithm 2. In Algorithm
2 the fault-aware AI training and inference flow is shown for
the accelerator. The minimum acceptable inference accuracy
(Acc_In f_threshold), the training data set, accelerator’s non-
critical fault rate (FRnon−crit), IDs of all faulty PEs and a
fault adjustment step size (δstep) are provided as inputs to the
algorithm in Lines 2 to 6. The algorithm reports the maximum
allowed faulty PE rate (i.e., the fraction of the total PEs in the
accelerator that are faulty), FRmax_non−crit that will allow the
achievement of desired inference accuracy Acc_In f_threshold.
In Lines 11 to 16, after each iteration of retraining - with
fault effect modeled in the backpropagation - the obtained
accuracy is compared with the desired inference accuracy
Acc_In f_threshold. If the accuracy goal is not met, the fault
rate FRmax_non−crit is reduced by a small step δstep, until the
desired accuracy goal is met. After the training converges and
the inference accuracy target is reached, the trained weight and
bias parameters of the NN/CNN are obtained. Additionally, the
maximum allowed faulty PE rate, FRmax_non−crit , is reported.
During inference, the control unit and FSR will read this
FRmax_non−crit and disable some faulty PE to achieve this
FRmax_non−crit rate.
The benefits from this combined training-inference method-
ology are, (i) in achieving the same inference accuracy, the
fault-aware training approach will allow the accelerator to
endure a higher FRmax_non−crit compared to the scenario where
no retraining is used. This will allow the availability of
more PEs during inference if fault-aware retraining was used.
(ii) Although there will be additional time required for the
retraining step, this extra cost will be amortized on the multiple
inference runs. Because, the general trend in AI is to train the
NN/CNN once accurately, and then this pre-trained model is
used many times during inference. As a result, the extra PEs
- made available by the fault-aware training - present during
each inference will significantly speed up the inference tasks.
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
To demonstrate the impact of circuit faults in the MAC unit
on the accuracy of AI tasks we used the RTL of the MAC
unit present in each PE. In identifying the critical and non-
critical circuit faults in the MAC of a PE and corresponding
Table I
FAULT STATISITICS FOR SIGNED INT8 MULTIPLIER AND ADDER
Case Totalcells
Number of
stuck-at faults
Total test
patterns
Test
coverage
All faults
included 206 878 24 100%
Critical faults
only (Fcrit )
198 854 23 100%
Non-critical faults
only (Fnon−crit )
8 24 4 100%
Table II
FAULT STATISITICS FOR 32-BIT FLOATING POINT MULTIPLIER AND ADDER
Case Totalcells
Number of
stuck-at faults
Total test
patterns
Test
coverage
All faults
included 2379 12092 401 98.36%
Critical faults
only (Fcrit )
1997 9993 342 98.35%
Non-critical faults
only (Fnon−crit )
382 2099 109 99.68%
test pattern generation, we analyzed both int8 and FP32
format implementations. First, the RTL of signed 8-bit MAC
unit was developed, followed by gate-level synthesis with
SAED [41] 28nm standard cell library with Synopsys Design
Compiler (DC) [41]. During synthesis, DC tool implemented
the signed multiplier using the Baugh-Wooly architecture
available in DesignWare [41] IP library. The 16-bit adder
unit was implemented using the Carry Look Ahead (CLA)
structure from the DesignWare IP library. After the complete
gate-level netlist of the MAC was available, a custom TCL
script was developed for the logic cone analysis of the output
bits. Without loss of generality, we selected the first two bits of
the LSB (i.e., bits 0 and bit 1) as non-critical, implying that the
worst-case total MAC error - due to stuck-at faults - resulting
from these two bits is ±(20 + 21 + 22). Bit positions 2 to 7
were taken as critical. Next, using the developed TCL script
with DC we obtained critical (Gcrit ) and non-critical (Gnon−crit )
standard cell logic gates present in the logic cones of critical
and non-critical bits, respectively, as described in Algorithm 1
in Section 3(B). Next, the gate-level netlist and the critical and
non-critical fault lists were taken to TestMAX ATPG tool [41]
and three sets of ATPG test patterns were generated âA˘S¸ (i)
with all faults, (ii) only with the critical faults, (iii) considering
only the non-critical faults. The results are shown in Table I.
The reason that the number of test patterns for the all-faults
case is lower than the sum of critical-only and non-critical-only
cases is due to the method of ATPG pattern generation, where
a single pattern can sometimes detect faults from both critical
and non-critical groups. However, the test pattern counts to test
the critical-only faults is less than the all-faults case in Table
I. This critical pattern set can be applied first to all the PEs in
a broadcast manner to identify if there are any PEs that must
be disabled, this is because, having a critical fault in MAC
introduces a large magnitude of error. Next, for the PEs that
passed the first test, we apply the test patterns from Row 4 of
Table I to test the presence of any non-critical faults. If faults
are detected by this pattern set, the IDs of the faulty PEs are
recorded in FSR memory as explained in Section III(c).
As discusses in Section 2, for training NN/CNN 32-bit
floating-point numbers are used for best precision [1]. To isolate
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Figure 9. Inference accuracy changes with fault rates for NN running MNIST dataset: (a) Without pruning, (b) With 30% pruning and retraining; Normalized
accuraacy changes with fault rates: (c) Without pruning, (d) With 30% pruning and retraining.
the critical and non-critical faults of a 32-bit floating-point
MAC, we obtained a 32-bit floating-point MAC benchmark
circuit from OpenCores [42]. Similar, to the int8 case above,
we synthesized a gate-level netlist of the 32-bit MAC using the
DesignWare IP library. For the floating-point MAC, we took
the first 5 LSB bits (bits 0 to 4) of the mantissa as non-critical,
and the rest of the bits of mantissa, the exponent and sign
bit are considered critical. We chose these bits because FP32
precision changes by a small fraction for lower-order bits of
mantissa, whereas any errors in higher-order bits of mantissa
and exponent/sign bits will corrupt the MAC output. After
identifying the critical and non-critical gates and corresponding
faults, the fault lists and the gate-level netlist were taken to the
ATPG tool and test patterns were generated similar to the int8
case above. The results are shown in Table II. First, the test
patterns from Row 3 of Table II are applied to identify all faulty
PEs that must be disabled to prevent significant accuracy loss
in AI tasks. After that, the non-critical faults are identified with
the patterns from Row 4 of Table II. All PEs that failed this
second test have non-critical faults and their IDs are recorded
in FSR.
To analyze the impact of PE/MAC faults on the inference
accuracy of NN, we implemented a 4-layer NN with two
hidden layers, and varied the number of neurons in the hidden
layers. Also, both un-pruned and 30% pruned (with-retraining)
[24]-[26] versions were implemented. For NN experiments
we used MATLAB deep learning toolbox [43]. All weights
and activations were quantized in int8 format using MATLAB
Fixed-Point tool [43]. To incorporate the worst-case non-critical
MAC faults - obtained from the gate-level netlist above - into
the NN inference task, the matrix multiplication function in
forward pass of the NN used in inference was modified in
MATLAB to inject faults. The relationship between accuracy
and fault rates are shown in Fig. 9. It can be observed from Fig.
9 (c) that, other than the smaller 100 hidden layer case, the rest
of the NN implementations are robust to faults in the MAC,
with normalized accuracy changes less than 0.5% at 5% fault
rate. With pruning (Fig. 9 (d)), the accuracy degrades slightly
more with faults. This is because with pruning less number of
neurons are present, and those that are present become more
important.
To assess the impact of MAC circuit faults on the accuracy
of CNN, we used several key benchmark CNNs âA˘S¸ AlexNet
[11], VGG-16 [13], ResNet-50 [12] and LeNet-5 [39]. The
number of convolution, linear layers and the total number
Table III
MULTIPLICATION AND ADDITIONS IN CNN TO CLASSIFY ONE IMAGE
CNN
Architecture
Conv2d
Layers
Linear
Layers
Number of
Multiplications
Number of
Additions
LeNet-5 3 2 416,520 416,520
AlexNet 5 3 714,188,480 714,188,480
VGG-16 13 3 15,470,264,320 15,470,264,320
ResNet-50 53 1 3,729,522,688 1,761,820,672
of multiplication and additions required (without pruning) to
classify each image in these networks are tabulated in Table III.
These results were obtained using custom functions developed
in Pytorch [44]. For the smaller CNN, LeNet-5, we performed
both training and inference with MNIST dataset of size 70,000
[39]. For the complex architectures - AlexNet, VGG-16 and
ResNet-50 - training takes several days and requires multiple
GPUs [11]-[13]. In Pytorch [44] library, pre-trained versions of
these CNNs are available where they were already trained with
ImageNet [14] dataset having 14 million training images and
1000 possible classes. In our experiments we used these pre-
trained models and performed inference with the 50,000 images
from the ImageNet [14] validation dataset. During inference,
the models were quantized into int8 format using PytorchâA˘Z´s
âA˘Ÿtorch.nn.quantizedâA˘Z´ library. To incorporate the worst-
case non-critical MAC faults - obtained from the gate-level
netlist above - in the inference function of the CNN, we
used PytorchâA˘Z´s âA˘Ÿregister_ f orward_hookâA˘Z´ feature to
access the data in Conv2d function and injected the MAC
faults. The accuracy changes - in the standard Top-1 and Top-5
format - with MAC faults are shown in Fig. 10 for 50,000
test images from ImageNet [14]. Top-1 accuracy implies that
the predicted class matches exactly the actual class (out of
1000 possible classes) and Top-5 refers to the case where the
actual class is within the top 5 predicted classes [11]-[13][44].
From Fig. 10 (e), it can be seen that the normalized accuracy
in Top-1 category changes by less than 1.5% for all networks
when fault rates are within 5%. For the Top-5 category in
Fig. 10 (f), except for the computationally intensive VGG-16
network, the normalized accuracy degradation was confined
within 1% for fault rates up to 5%. Next, we pruned 30% of the
filter weights of the convolution layers and repeated our fault
injection experiments. Form Fig. 10 (g)-(h), it can be seen that,
with pruning, the normalized Top-1 accuracy degraded by a
small amount with worst-case happening for ResNet-50 where
it degraded by 2.2% for fault rate 5%. Even with pruning, the
Top-5 normalized accuracy degradation was within 1% for fault
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Figure 10. Inference accuracy changes with fault rates for different CNNs running imagenet dataset. (a), (b) Top-1 and Top-5 accuracy changes ; (c), (d)
Top-1 and Top-5 accuracy changes with model pruning; (e) to (h) normalized accuracy changes in Top-1 and Top-5 (with and without pruning) for fault rates.
rates up to 5%. Note that, during our pruning experiments on
AlexNet/VGG-16/ResNet-50 retraining was not done, because
it would have required us to retrain the networks with 14
million images using a large number of GPUs. Retraining
during pruning would improve the accuracy further [24]-[26].
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Figure 11. Improvement in accuracy with fault-aware retraining on LeNet-5.
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Figure 12. Accuracy change of LeNet-5 CNN with faults for approximate
and exact multipliers without retraining.
As discussed in Section III(c)(2), using our proposed fault-
aware retraining flow some of the accuracy loss due to faults in
MAC units can be recovered by incorporating the fault effects in
the backpropagation-based weight update segment and allowing
the CNN to adapt accordingly. To experimentally demonstrate
this technique, we used the LeNet-5 CNN architecture. We
picked the simpler LeNet-5 architecture over AlexNet/VGG-
16/ResNet-50 because of the computational complexity of
retraining. Whereas AlexNet/VGG-16/ResNet-50 would require
multiple GPUs and several days of training with ImageNet data
[11]-[13], the LeNet-5 can be trained in several minutes on
MNIST dataset using CPU. We used 6-core Intel core i7 CPU
with 24GB RAM in this retraining experiment. Using 32-bit
floating-point (FP32) format, and taking last 5 LSB bits (bits 0
to bit 4) of mantissa as non-critical, we modeled the equivalent
worst-case MAC error - corresponding to faults occurring in
the logic cones of these bits - in the backpropagation segment
using PytorchâA˘Z´s âA˘Ÿregister_backward_hookâA˘Z´ feature
[44]. Results from this fault-aware retraining are shown in
Fig. 11. It can be seen that for 7.5% fault rate the normalized
accuracy loss improved from 0.5% to 0.22% due to fault-aware
retraining.
In Section II(A), we explained that the presence of defect-
induced circuit faults in approximate NN/CNN will deteriorate
the AI task’s accuracy as errors from approximations in MAC
were already introduced in the model, and any further error from
circuit faults will be detrimental. In Fig. 12, the normalized
change of accuracy with respect to faults for LeNet-5 on
MNIST dataset is shown for cases where exact and approximate
multipliers were used in the convolution function. In [31] a
comprehensive analysis (with approximation aware retraining)
of different types approximate multipliers on the efficiency of
neural networks were performed, and the best approximate
multipliers in terms of prediction accuracy were reported. Based
on these findings [31], in our experiment as an approximate
multiplier, we chose mul8_134 from the open-source library
of EvoApprox8b [37]. As discussed in [28][31], the accuracy
of CNN/NN using approximate multipliers are very sensitive
to proper training compared to regular multipliers, and the
backpropagation training phase must be updated to account for
approximate computing. In our experiment, the initial training
phase was updated (using Pytorch’s hook functions [44]) to
account for the use of 8-bit approximate multiplier, also int8
quantization was used. From Fig. 12, it can be observed that
the presence of faults in the 2 LSB bits will degrade the
performance of neural networks with approximate multipliers
significantly, compared to their counterparts that are using
exact multipliers. Hence, if yield loss reduction is the primary
goal, exact MAC units need to be used to account for possible
circuit faults.
From these detailed analyses of gate-level synthesis, fault
isolation, ATPG pattern generation for the MAC circuit, and
corresponding simulation of fault effects on standard NN/CNN
benchmarks, it can be observed that certain circuit faults -
based on their locations in the circuit - have minimal impact
on the AI task’s accuracy when the fault rate is within an upper
limit. For example, with 5% fault rate in non-critical gates, the
normalized Top-5 accuracy loss in CNNs is less than 1% (Fig.
10(f)(h)). If this 1% accuracy loss is acceptable, and if there are
more than 5% faulty PEs, then we can deactivate some faulty
PEs such that the fault rate is within 5%. As a result, an AI
accelerator chip with few faulty PEs can be shipped, improving
valuable yield and revenue. The tradeoff in this yield saving
would be the lower number of PE blocks in the accelerator
due to the deactivation of few faulty PEs to keep the fault rate
within an acceptable limit (i.e., 5%), however, this will not have
any functional impact, and will only reduce the throughput
marginally. Furthermore, the reduced throughput PEs can be
binned and priced differently without totally discarding the
chip, thus saving yield.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a yield loss reduction and test
methodology for AI accelerator chips densely packed with
PEs. Exploiting the error-healing properties of backpropagation
during training and the inherent fault tolerance features of
trained AI models during inference, we obtained an analytical
relationship between fault location and fault rate of MAC, and
the AI task’s accuracy to guide yield decisions. Simulation
results on NN/CNN show that the proposed YAOTA approach
will allow up to 5% faulty PEs in the accelerator at the expense
of less than 1% loss in the AI task’s accuracy.
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